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Tensions flare as Ghor residents confront Taliban forces Protests over house raids and counternarcotics efforts in Pasaband and Shahrak lead to shootings, arrests, and allegations of ethnic discrimination. 21 Nov 2024 Clashes in Pasaband district On 26 October 2024, 8am Media reported that residents of Pasaband district, Ghor province, had clashed with Taliban forces who attempted to destroy drug production facilities. On the same day, the Afghanistan International news outlet alleged that locals of the same district had been protesting Taliban house searches and mistreatment of women, and that Taliban forces had used violence in response. Both sources claim that six civilians were wounded as a result. Footage shared by a local shows a crowd of people gathered in Sinay (Figure 1 below), on the outskirts of Pasaband district, positioned opposite a likely Taliban outpost (white rectangle) where several armed men are positioned, facing an approaching crowd of people. The outpost appears to have a white flag on its rooftop, to the east of the clearing. AW identified at least ten individuals guarding the outpost, and approximately 150-200 individuals, who appear to be locals, gathered to the west of it. One of the armed individuals is positioned on a rooftop by the outpost’s east [marked in red ellipse], and is shown shooting eight rounds at the crowd, possibly in an effort to disperse them and stop them from advancing. The smoke from the gunfire is visible in the footage (marked in grey cloud shapes). Figure 1: Still from footage of the incident, and the area marked on satellite imagery [33.396941, 65.035995]. In a separate video released later in the day by Afghanistan International , a man, reportedly wounded during the Taliban shooting, is shown with a bandaged hand and an attached bag of blood - likely a blood transfusion bag - while being assisted by others, seemingly near the area of the incident in Pasaband district. Background conversation in the video suggests that the injured man is one of the protestors wounded in Sinay. Figure 2: A man reportedly injured from the Taliban shooting during the incident in the Sinay area of Pasaband district, Ghor. [source: X/@sakhiSanjar1987] Pasaband district is located in southernmost Ghor and has a population of 92,000. According to a district profile by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from 2003, 85% of the population in Pasaband are Tajik, 11% Pahstun and 5% Hazara. AW verified that the people in the video from Sinay were speaking in Dari, indicating that they could belong to non-Pashtun, Dari-speaking groups (Tajik or Hazara). Clashes in Shahrak district In a similar incident, locals reportedly clashed with the Taliban in Shahrak district, located in northwestern Ghor province. On 1 November 2024, Paigah News reported that residents of Yamgak village of Tangi Azao area in Shahrak district, aggravated by alleged Taliban raids of residential houses, clashed with Taliban forces, and beat and disarmed some Taliban. In a video allegedly recorded by a resident of Tangi Azao, an alleged group of Taliban forces are seen retreating as a crowd of residents attack them with sticks. A male voice, likely a village resident, is heard calling on villagers “not to let a single [Taliban] leave the village”. He shouts at the group of apparently retreating Taliban, saying, “Do not dare to enter our houses again”. In another video recorded from a distance further away, gunshots and sirens from at least two military vehicles can be heard, as people including children disperse in different directions. AW verified the presence of one dark green Ford Ranger pickup car, a vehicle predominantly used by Taliban police, in the area of the incident. Figure 3: (Bottom left and on the right) Stills from footage of the incident in Yamgak village of Tangi Azao area, Shahrak district, matching satellite imagery (top left) [34.12354, 64.23908]. Local sources told Azadi Radio on 2 November 2024 that the Taliban had subsequently arrested 30 residents, including children from Tangi Azao village, after a clash with the villagers. At the time of writing, the Taliban has yet to issue a statement regarding the incident. Conflicting claims about causes While the incidents happened in two separate locations in different parts of the province and took place at least one week apart, both relate to claims that local residents were angered by alleged Taliban raids of residential properties. Multiple locals also claimed that Taliban used violence and mistreated women during the alleged search operations. Afghanistan International reported that the incident in Pasaband district occurred after locals were outraged about the Taliban carrying out individual searches of women. In a video from Pasaband district, also shared by Afghanistan International, people are shown expressing their anger by chanting “Allahu Akbar” [God is great]. Among the voices audible in the crowd, a man is heard saying that they (the local people) were not harassed as badly by even the Soviets or the Americans in the past, as they are now by the Taliban. In Tangi Azao, Porana News reported on 2 November 2024 that residents of the village had clashed with the Taliban forces after they had allegedly beaten a woman during a house search. The report further claimed that a Taliban commander known as Wasiq and his forces had entered homes and used violence against residents. Alleged Taliban counternarcotics efforts 8am Media claimed that the clash in Pasaband district took place on 26 October 2024, when the Taliban destroyed ephedra (a plant used as a precursor in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine) processing facilities in the area. On 27 October 2024, Azadi Radio reported that Abdul Wahid Hammas, Taliban spokesperson for the Governor of Ghor, claimed that Taliban forces had raided drug production facilities and arrested an unspecified number of individuals, when they came under fire from local residents. Hammas argued that the Taliban forces had to defend themselves, and fired at the “rebels” in response. AW could not verify Abdul Wahid Hammas’ claims. While the Taliban have not made further official statements on the clashes in Ghor, the Taliban’s Deputy Ministry for Counternarcotics and several Taliban-affiliated media outlets circulated several reports on the seizure and destruction of a variety of drugs and several narcotics processing factories in Ghor between 26 October and 5 November 2024. This is likely an indirect attempt by the Taliban to reinforce the idea that the clashes were triggered by resistance to counternarcotics efforts. There are past examples of violent resistance to Taliban counternarcotics operations. Locals in several districts of Badakhshan, for example, clashed with the Taliban in May 2024 when Taliban attempted to destroy local poppy fields. Claims of ethnically or personally motivated violence by the Taliban Residents of Tangi Azao further told Paigah News that on 31 October 2024, the day before the alleged clashes, Taliban members had torn up pictures of Ahmad Shah Massoud, a former prominent anti-Taliban commander, and Dr Ibrahim Malikzada, a Tajik local former MP and anti-Soviet commander, during house raids. On 2 November 2024, Mahmoud Saikal , former Afghan Ambassador to the UN, quoting local sources, claimed that the Taliban had entered people’s houses in Shahrak district twice in a single day “with personal motives” but under the pretext of house searches. AW could not verify these allegations, although - as noted above - residents featured in the videos were Dari speaking, indicating they belong to non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, there have been numerous clashes between ethnic groups in Ghor province. For example, in October 2023 , Tajik and Pashtun Taliban members reportedly clashed in the provincial capital Firozkoh (also known as Chaghcharan) over arbitrary arrests carried out by the latter. Share

18 Nov 2024

Reports and Analysis Original reporting by the Afghan Witness team 21 Nov 2024 Urban warfare defines anti-Taliban resistance as AFF & NRF claim 294 attacks in 2024 Analysis highlights growing operational reach of NRF and AFF, with Kabul and northern provinces at the epicentre. Read more 21 Nov 2024 Tensions flare as Ghor residents confront Taliban forces Protests over house raids and counternarcotics efforts in Pasaband and Shahrak lead to shootings, arrests, and allegations of ethnic discrimination. Read more 21 Nov 2024 Afghan factions react to Trump victory with mixed expectations Pro-Taliban accounts mock U.S. intervention hopes, while anti-Taliban groups see the election as a chance for renewed resistance. Read more 21 Nov 2024 Public execution in Paktia marks Taliban’s shift in showcasing Sharia enforcement Media allowed to film outside the stadium as Haqqani ministers highlight both unity and an attempt at clemency. Read more 18 Nov 2024 Land clearance in Kabul Officially framed as infrastructure development, the demolition campaign forces vulnerable populations out, erasing informal settlements and impacting minority neighbourhoods. Read more 5 Nov 2024 Taliban minister’s comments sparks outrage over “women’s voice ban” When acting Minister Hanafi discussed elements of the law on virtue and vice, misinterpretations spread globally. Read more 5 Nov 2024 Taliban implements ban on living beings in media Media outlets forced to cease visual content, limiting news coverage to audio and graphics. Read more 5 Nov 2024 Kabul: three attacks in three days highlight precarious security situation NRF and AFF target Taliban in Kabul as unclaimed explosion leaves civilians caught in escalating violence. Read more 29 Oct 2024 Afghan immigrants shot at Iranian border On 13 October 2024, hundreds of Afghan migrants were shot at near the Iran-Pakistan border, reportedly by Iranian border guards. Read more 21 Oct 2024 Pro-Taliban outlet releases alleged AI-generated audio of former Afghan commander arranging mercenary deal Clips alleged to show former commander Sadat arranging mercenaries for Ukraine spark controversy, with allegations of AI manipulation. Read more Load more

Public execution in Paktia marks Taliban’s shift in showcasing Sharia enforcement Media allowed to film outside the stadium as Haqqani ministers highlight both unity and an attempt at clemency. 21 Nov 2024 Feature image: X/TOLO News . On 13 November 2024, the Taliban Supreme Court announced that a public execution had taken place in southern Paktia province. According to the official statement, a man named Mohammad Ayaz had been convicted of murder and executed in the morning on the same day at a sports stadium in Gardez, the provincial capital of Paktia. 8am Media and RTA Radio reported that Ayaz was accused of killing a Taliban fighter named Habibullah in June 2021. The Supreme Court claimed that the victim’s family was consulted and chose not to forgive Ayaz, meaning the punishment was carried out under the principle of Qisas (the Islamic concept of justice through divine retribution). Hurriyat Radio Pashto , a Taliban-affiliated outlet, and Tolo News , an independent Afghan news agency, published video reports showing hundreds of people moving towards the stadium to watch the execution. Photos and videos of people gathering to watch public punishments have circulated on social media before, but this is the first time Taliban officials appear to have allowed media outlets to film the surrounding area of an execution. Despite this seeming relaxation of a Taliban issued order against filming or photographing public punishments, it is notable that media limited themselves to footage from outside the stadium, not showing the actual event. Figure 1 below shows the geolocation of the footage of people walking towards the Gardez stadium on 13 November 2024. Figure 1: Geolocation of the reported public execution at the Gardez stadium, announced by the Supreme Court of Afghanistan on 13 November 2024 [33.652554, 69.224177]. This apparent change in policy is possibly an attempt by the de-facto authorities to showcase public support for the implementation of Sharia law. According to Hurriyat News , the implementation of Qisas was attended by “thousands of common people, scholars, officials and Mujahideen [Taliban members], and the measure was welcomed by the general public”. The Supreme Court also mentioned the presence of senior officials during the execution, including Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani, acting Interior Minister, and Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, acting Minister of Refugees. On 13 November 2022, Taliban Spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid announced that the judges of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan were required to implement Qisas when Sharia conditions were met. Last week’s execution in Paktia marked the fifth time Qisas has officially been enforced in the country since the Taliban takeover. The previous four executions took place in the provinces of Farah , Laghman , Ghazni , and Jawzjan , all of men convicted of murder. A reported intervention by Sirjauddin Haqqani On 16 November 2024, Hurriyat Radio Pashto released a second video report on the execution. The nine-minute footage showed Ayaz’s funeral and burial ceremony, and contained interviews with his family members, Taliban officials and locals. One of Ayaz’s relatives confirmed that Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban acting Minister of the Interior, offered the family AFN 20,000,000 (approximately GBP 232,400) to pardon the alleged murderer, which was refused. Ayaz’s father, who was also interviewed, praised Haqqani for his efforts in trying to prevent the execution, confirming the Supreme Court’s initial statement that there had been an attempt to spare Ayaz’s life. Meanwhile, an Afghan account on X (formerly Twitter) - apparently a supporter of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a fundamentalist group with increasingly tense relations with the Taliban - claimed that Western powers aim to divide the Taliban into "moderates" and "hardliners". The account referenced The New York Times article published on 24 October 2024 that portrayed Haqqani as a moderate figure, and a potential “hope” for improved relations with the West. The account, however, argued that the Haqqanis presence at the execution shows that the Taliban are united in their commitment to their rigid implementation of Sharia law. Remarks Overall, the Taliban are apparently trying to push two major narratives through coverage of the event. Firstly, it emphasises alleged public support for Sharia punishments by showing a high attendance of locals at the execution. Second, it appears aimed at elevating Haqqani’s image, portraying him as a moderate who showed sympathy to Ayaz by urging the victim's family to pardon him. Furthermore, this is the only public execution so far attended exclusively by ministers from the Haqqani faction of the Taliban (Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani and Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani). Although this could partially be explained by the fact that both ministers are Paktia natives, it is notable that previous similar events have been attended by a mix of high-ranking Taliban officials from both the Kandahari and Haqqani factions. A possible reason is that the recent article in The New York Times triggered a reaction among the de facto authorities, and that the attendance of two ministers from the so-called “moderate” Haqqani faction was an attempt to project unity and dispel rumours of internal tensions. Share

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21 Nov 2024

Afghan factions react to Trump victory with mixed expectations Pro-Taliban accounts mock U.S. intervention hopes, while anti-Taliban groups see the election as a chance for renewed resistance. 21 Nov 2024 On 6 November 2024, following Donald Trump's victory in the U.S. presidential election, Afghans from across the political spectrum shared a broad range of reactions on social media. This report provides an analysis of the response from both official and unofficial pro- and anti-Taliban voices. Official Taliban reactions On 6 November 2024, Abdul Qahar Balkhi, Taliban spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shared an official statement on Trump’s victory in Pashto , Dari , and English via his X (formerly Twitter) account, which has 250,000 followers. The post was subsequently reposted by both the Ministry's official account and the Taliban's spokesperson, Mawlawi Zabihullah Mujahid . The Taliban's statement, while refraining from congratulating Trump, expressed hope for progress in relations with the new U.S. administration. It emphasised that, like the Doha agreement that ended the Afghan “occupation”, Trump should use his second term to play a constructive role in resolving regional and global conflicts, particularly in Gaza and Lebanon. Other pro-Taliban responses The responses from pro-Taliban accounts on the consequences of Trump’s victory largely touched on three themes: Dismissing a possible return of U.S. troops On 6 November 2024, a pro-Taliban X account with over 94,000 followers shared a photo of the remnants of a vehicle allegedly used in a Taliban suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to attack U.S. forces in Paktia during the previous government. In a apparent response to calls for a new U.S. intervention under Trump, the post stressed the Taliban’s commitment to mutual respect in diplomacy, but also said that any U.S. return would be met with fierce resistance, including suicide attacks. On 7 November 2024, a pro-Taliban account with over 120,000 followers dismissed the possibility of U.S. troops returning to Bagram (the site of the largest U.S. air base during the conflict) as unrealistic. The account argued that it was Trump, rather than Biden, who had prioritised the withdrawal agreement, even floating the prospect of holding its signing ceremony at Camp David , the U.S. presidential retreat. Another pro-Taliban account with over 91,000 followers posted on 7 November 2024, “Some of our fugitive countrymen are thrilled at the prospect of Trump’s return... These foolish deserters fail to realise that the decision to withdraw American troops was, in fact, made by Trump himself”. Several other pro-Taliban accounts with thousands of followers dismissed the idea of U.S. troops returning to Bagram Air Base as unrealistic , arguing that Trump has already " tested " the Taliban and would not redeploy forces. They added that the Taliban were ready to resume fighting in the case of a return of U.S. troops. Sharing past Trump remarks on the Taliban, conflict and hijabs Several pro-Taliban accounts, with a combined hundreds of thousands of followers on X, shared past remarks of Trump’s in which he referred to the Taliban as tough warriors who inflicted significant losses on the U.S. They also quoted Trump’s suggestion that warfare was a “ hobby ” for the Taliban, similar to how others play football. On 6 November 2024, a pro-Taliban account with over 7,000 followers shared a video from 2016 where Trump says that the U.S. should not interfere with women’s choice to wear veils, calling it a “slap in the face” of exiled pro-Western Afghans. Some pro-Taliban accounts , meanwhile, quoted Trump’s statements about avoiding new wars and working to end ongoing conflicts. They used these remarks to taunt those who hoped a Trump victory would lead to a return of U.S. troops. Highlighting the Taliban’s staunch commitment to Sharia On 6 November 2024, a pro-Taliban X account with nearly 27,000 followers posted an old audio clip from Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban Supreme Leader, where he asserts that the group will never compromise on Sharia, even in the face of nuclear threats. The accompanying post says that the Taliban will never “negotiate on Sharia” whether “Trump or anyone else” is in power. On the same day, another pro-Taliban account with over 23,000 followers posted a video showing a Taliban military convoy that had stopped to allow soldiers to pray, commenting, “Trump’s allies and America’s servants should know that these heroes have no fear of Trump, America or people like you—and they don’t care”. Other pro-Taliban social media users mainly focused on mocking loyalists of the former Afghan administration , particularly those who migrated to the West after the Taliban takeover. They labelled them " slaves of America " who are living in poor conditions in refugee camps , and suggested that Trump might eventually deport them back to Afghanistan. Official opposition reactions On 6 November, the Afghanistan United Front, an anti-Taliban group led by General Sami Sadat, a former Afghan Special Forces commander based in the U.S. who supported Trump’s candidacy, congratulated Trump. The group called for U.S. “political and technical support” to defeat the Taliban through "a renewed partnership and strategic action between the U.S. and Afghan Freedom Forces". On the same day, Sadat told Afghanistan International that “Trump's victory would bring an end to the Taliban's rule”. On 6 November, the National Resistance Front (NRF), an armed opposition group to the Taliban, also congratulated Trump on his victory. The group expressed hope that the new administration would support and recognise the Afghan people’s resistance against the Taliban, global terrorism, and their legitimate aspirations for a democratic, decentralised, and pluralistic Afghanistan. On 8 November, the National Resistance Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan - a political opposition group to the Taliban composed of former jihadi and political leaders from Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, and other ethnic groups - expressed hope that the new U.S. administration would assist Afghans in ending the ongoing conflict to achieve a just peace. Responses by other anti-Taliban accounts Referring to the Taliban's seemingly conciliatory post-election messages, some anti-Taliban X accounts claimed that the group is concerned about Trump’s victory, and is signalling a willingness to adjust its policies if necessary to prevent any further cuts in aid. On 6 November 2024, prominent Afghan journalist Habib Khan, with over 244,000 followers on X, posted , “Honestly, I don’t think Trump’s comeback to the White House will shake up U.S. policy on Afghanistan. But why does [sic] the Taliban seem so scared”? In response, former Afghan parliamentarian Mariam Solaimankhil, who has over 94,000 followers, quoted his post, adding , “No other candidates ever made bigger threats to the Taliban since the collapse”. On 7 November 2024, an anti-Taliban account with nearly 5,000 followers posted a photoshopped image of Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban spokesperson, alongside apparent Taliban fighters in a cave, commenting that Trump’s victory will force the Taliban back to their former mountain hideouts. Although Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) Afghanistan - a pan-Islamist radical group - did not officially weigh in on the U.S. election, some pro-HuT accounts criticised the Taliban Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ openness to improved relations with the U.S. They called “any deal and relations” with the U.S. contrary to Sharia, stating that the current U.S.-led world order is on the brink of collapse, while those tied to it would face a similar downfall. Remarks Donald Trump's election prompted diverse responses across Afghan social media. The Taliban cautiously expressed hope for progress in relations with the new administration, while other pro-Taliban accounts dismissed the prospect of a renewed U.S. intervention and reaffirmed their commitment to Sharia law and armed resistance, if necessary. In contrast, anti-Taliban groups celebrated Trump's victory as a potential challenge to Taliban rule, with some mocking the group’s perceived anxiety over his return. Meanwhile, HuT supporters condemned Taliban efforts to engage with the U.S. as contrary to Sharia. AW notes that while both pro- and anti-Taliban factions are using Trump’s victory to strengthen their own narratives, the new U.S. administration’s policy on Afghanistan is still unclear . Share

21 Nov 2024

Urban warfare defines anti-Taliban resistance as AFF & NRF claim 294 attacks in 2024 Analysis highlights growing operational reach of NRF and AFF, with Kabul and northern provinces at the epicentre. 21 Nov 2024 As of November 2024, two well-established armed opposition groups remain active against the Taliban de facto authorities in Afghanistan. The National Resistance Front (NRF) and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) both emerged within the first year after Taliban takeover, with NRF announcing themselves days after the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021, and AFF some months later, in March 2022. Initially, NRF focused on more traditional insurgent tactics by attempting to conquer and hold territory, in particular in the Panjshir Valley. After losing its ground there in 2022, the group appears to have slowly switched to a more modern form of urban guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, the AFF has adopted the latter strategy since its inception. Despite this clear change of tactics by the NRF, both groups still announced the start of their “fighting seasons” until as recently as 2023 . In practice, however, this period - traditionally lasting from spring through autumn, before the cold Afghan winter leads to a lull in violence - has largely lost its meaning, as the groups increasingly focused on urban areas where cold weather is less of an impediment to attacks. Perhaps to reflect this, neither group announced the start of “fighting season” in 2024. In this analysis, AW assesses activities by both groups between January and October of this year. Analysis of the number of attacks by AFF and NRF AW analysed all claimed attacks announced by AFF and NRF social media accounts . Between 1 January and 31 October 2024, they claimed a combined total of 294 attacks against Taliban targets across 17 provinces. The NRF claimed the majority of these attacks (222, or some 75.5%), while AFF claims 72 attacks (24.5%). Figure 1 below shows the number of claimed attacks during the first ten months of the year. The clear drop in AFF operations in March can be explained by the group’s announcement of a “suspension of military activity during the holy month of Ramadan” through a statement on 11 March 2024. While the number of AFF attacks remained somewhat stable throughout the rest of the year, NRF operations have increased sharply since March. That could indicate that, despite the change in tactics to more guerrilla-style warfare, the group still operates on a somewhat seasonal pattern. AW also assessed how the groups substantiated their claims, as armed groups in Afghanistan have been accused of falsely claiming attacks in the past. In total, the groups provided a combined 93 pieces of evidence to support their claims, mostly in the form of video recordings of alleged attacks against Taliban targets. There is, however, a clear difference between the groups when it comes to releasing evidence . While NRF only provided videos of 21.6% of their operations to support claims , AFF numbers were much higher at 62.5% (see Figure 2 below). The reasons for this striking discrepancy are not immediately clear. AW, however, believes it is possibly due to NRF having a more well-established status - including through its high-profile leader, Ahmad Massoud - and therefore feels its reputation alone is enough to substantiate claims. AFF, on the other hand, is a newly formed group, whose leader General Yasin Zia is well-known among Afghans but has less of an international profile. Therefore, there may be more pressure on its members to use recordings to prove their claims. AW also noted that AFF’s announcements on their main social media account were always in Farsi and Pashto , seemingly targeting an Afghan audience. The group uses a separate account for their communications in English. Conversely, NRF shared their claims in Farsi and English using their main account , and a separate one when publishing their evidence. Both groups appear to be engaging international audiences, although using different communications tactics and emphasis. In terms of the geographic scope of AFF and NRF operations, AW found a notable increase in the number of provinces with claimed attacks from the first five months of the year (January to May 2024) to the following five months (June to October 2024). Figure 3 below shows provinces where attacks had been claimed by only NRF (burgundy), only AFF (green), or both groups (black). The map on the left shows attacks claimed between January and May 2024 and on the right between June to October. Both groups appeared to maintain a strong operational presence in several central provinces north of Kabul throughout the year. Additionally, NRF claimed attacks in several northeastern and western provinces, increasing their total reach from ten to 14 provinces. AFF seemingly focused on expanding their operations in northern regions, increasing their reach from six to eight provinces. In total, during the first ten months of the year, half (17) of all Afghan provinces saw claimed anti-Taliban attacks spearheaded by either NRF or AFF. Figure 3: Comparison between number of provinces with claimed attacks by NRF (burgundy), AFF (green) or both groups (black), between the first five months of 2024 (left), and the following five months (right). Despite operating across a broad geographic scope, both groups remain heavily focused on Kabul. The province accounted for 68% of all AFF claimed attacks and 40.5% of NRF attacks. However, while AFF only targeted Kabul city, NRF expanded some of their operations to the outskirts of the capital in the second half of 2024. AW recorded a total of 135 claimed attacks by AFF and NRF across 16 Police Districts (PDs) in Kabul between January and October 2024. Most of the areas were covered by both armed resistance groups, with the north of the city more targeted in general. NRF claimed 19 attacks in four PDs seemingly not targeted by AFF, as seen in Figure 4 below. Furthermore, AFF claimed one attack in PD3 , an area not targeted by NRF. Remarks As of November 2024, AFF and NRF remain the two main armed resistance groups operational in the country that regularly conduct attacks against Taliban targets. AW’s analysis of the groups’ reported activities between January and October 2024 reveals an increase in both the number of operations throughout the year and their expansion into new provinces. Both groups remain highly active in the capital, claiming a significant number of attacks across the majority of the city’s PDs. It is notable that AFF is much more diligent about providing evidence (mostly videos) of its attacks, while the more established NRF is perhaps relying on its “brand” alone for credibility. While the increase in the number and reach of claimed attacks observed during the first ten months of 2024 is a notable development, it is not an unexpected one. The groups have maintained steady operations during the past years despite being targeted by the Taliban, while the NRF's shift to guerrilla-style tactics have seemingly freed up resources for more sporadic attacks. Share