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The changing landscape of Afghanistan’s media On World Press Freedom Day, Afghan Witness looks at how Afghanistan’s media has changed since last August. 3 May 2022 Today, on World Press Freedom Day, Afghanistan dropped from 122nd place on the Press Freedom Index to 156th out of 180 countries. While the country’s media faced issues prior to the Taliban's return, since August of last year, journalists and experts report of increasing regulations, economic hardship, and in some cases, violence. Many media organisations have shut down According to the United Nations (UN) millions in the country face acute food insecurity. Media outlets – particularly smaller ones – have not been untouched by the economic impacts of the U.S. withdrawal. Faced with strict regulations and economic hardship, many media organisations have simply shut down. Others have been forced to make severe cuts to make ends meet. A survey conducted by Afghanistan National Journalists Union (ANJU) in February shows just 305 of the 623 media which were active in Afghanistan before the Taliban took control are still operating. According to the same survey, in February, just 2,334 journalists were still working from a pre-Taliban high of 5,069. One manager of a radio station Afghan Witness (AW) spoke to previously said he has had to reduce payment of each staff member from $150 to $70, as there are fewer commercial advertisements and the radio’s income has fallen. Women disproportionately impacted Most journalists who have lost their jobs have been women. Research also shows that the closure of media outlets has had a disproportionate impact on female journalists: 72% of those who have lost their jobs in the media are women, and ANJU says just 243 women were employed by media in Afghanistan at the time of their research. More specifically, female journalists outside of the capital have been particularly impacted by media restrictions, and these women report greater obstacles to establish their careers in the first place. In some provinces, Human Rights Watch (HRW) say there are no longer any women journalists. Others who are still working describe how their daily work routine has changed, they work “in the background” and avoid appearing in video or audio recordings. In November, female TV journalists and reporters were also instructed to cover their hair when broadcasting, and more recently, were ordered to cover their faces while on air - following a move which saw all women ordered to wear a face veil in public . Press restrictions Last October, HRW reported on a copy of regulations shown to the organisation which instructed media organisations to refrain from printing or broadcasting reports that “are contrary to Islam,” “insult national figures,” or “distort news content.” According to HRW, journalists were told reporting should be “balanced” and that they should not report on “matters that have not been confirmed by officials” or issues that “could have a negative impact on the public’s attitude.” According to the regulations seen by HRW, media outlets are required to “prepare detailed reports” with the new governmental regulatory body prior to publication. Reports of violence In the months that have followed the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, human rights groups have persistently flagged mounting reports of violence against journalists attempting to report in the country. HRW has published reports detailing cases whereby journalists claim to have been harassed, beaten , and arbitrarily detained by the Taliban. By October, the ANJU said there had been more than 30 instances of violence and threats of violence against Afghan journalists in just two months. In September, images of two Afghan journalists - reportedly beaten in Taliban detention - were widely shared across social media and covered by the international media. Those attempting to report on human rights and women’s rights in the country - particularly anti-Taliban protests - have reportedly faced disruption from Taliban members attempting to disperse crowds. AW has geolocated several protests where such cases have been reported. One journalist and photographer covering women’s rights protests previously told AW : “It is not the first time I’ve seen them [the Taliban] beating journalists… I went to cover the Dehmazang explosion [20th October], and they beat journalists there. They don’t allow journalists to cover the issues that aren’t in their own interests.” One journalist told AW that "no reporter is safe" in Afghanistan. Reports of arbitrary detentions In February, Reporters without Borders reported that since the Taliban takeover on 15 August 2021, at least 50 journalists and media workers have been detained or arrested by the police or Istikhbarat. While the Taliban have previously denied reprisals, the Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said in January that authorities had the right "to arrest and detain dissidents or those who break the law" – raising further questions over the future of journalists, former government and security personnel, and activists in the country. Broadcast ban on some international outlets In late March, it was reported that the Taliban had banned BBC television news from broadcasting bulletins in Pashto, Persian and Uzbek in Afghanistan. German broadcaster DW ( Deutsche Welle) also saw some of its programmes taken off air in Afghanistan, including DW's political talk show "Aashti", which was broadcast in Dari and Pashto on local partner ToloNews, with science programmes broadcast on Ariana TV and Shamshad also affected. Forced to flee In the aftermath of the takeover last August, many journalists attempted to leave the country, or some were evacuated by international organisations such as the International Federation of Journalists . Those who were not evacuated had to find their own way out, and many report of equally poor conditions in neighbouring countries. This is the case with one journalist AW spoke to recently, who claimed he had been detained and beaten by the Taliban after his phone was searched while reporting at a human rights protest. He told AW that “no reporter is safe” in Afghanistan, and that he had fled to a neighbouring country but that he “[does] not feel safe here, neither physically nor mentally.” He hoped to return to his journalism work in the future but is unsure whether this will be possible unless he can find refuge in a safe country. An uncertain future On World Press Freedom Day, the Friends of Afghan Women Ambassadors’ Group stated that they “deplore the erosion of rights for journalists and media institutions under the Taliban” and particularly note the “obstacles faced by female journalists working in Afghanistan.” When the Taliban swept back to power last August, Zabihullah Mujahid , the group’s spokesman, claimed the Taliban are “committed to the media within our cultural frameworks” and that “private media can continue to be free and independent”, adding that media workers’ rights – along with women’s rights – would be protected. However, claims from journalists on the ground – and research carried out by human rights groups – suggests a very different picture. Share

د انلاین کرکې د خبرو زیاتوالی د طالبانو له واکمنۍ راهیسې د نفوذ لرونکو افغان میرمنو په لور روان دی د افغان وتنس تحلیل موندلې چې په افغانستان کې د ښځو په وړاندې آنلاین ناوړه ګټه اخیستنه او ناسم معلومات د ٢٠٢١ کال په اګست او سپتمبر کې او د ٢٠٢٢ په جنوري کې لوړ شوي د ۲۰۲۱ کال د اکتوبر راهیسې افغان وتنس په افغانستان کې د ښځو وضعیت څاري، ترڅو ښه پوه شي چې څنګه د طالبانو لخوا وضع شوي او قوانین او مقررات د ښځو پر حقونو اغیزه کوي. د دې یوې برخې په توګه د افغان وتنس پلټونکو د آنلاین ځورونې او ناسم معلوماتو څارنه پیل کړه چې د افغان ښځو د حقونو فعالان په نښه کوي. د آنلاین جنسیت د کرکې په وینا کې د متخصصینو سره په همکارۍ پلټونکو په پښتو، دري او فارسي کې د عامو لعنتي کلمو یو پراخ لیست راټول کړ، کوم چې د مشهور ښځینه افغان نفوذ کونکو ١٠٢ ټویټر صفحي سره کراس چیک شوي. دا تغیرات د جنوري ٢٠٢١ څخه تر جنوري ٢٠٢٢ پورې په د مهال ویش په اوږدو کې اندازه شوي، دا ارزوي چې څنګه په مکرر ډول کلیدي ټکي او د پروفایل ذکرونه کراس پوسټ شوي. پایلې ښیي چې د ښځو په وړاندې آنلاین ناوړه ګټه اخیستنه او ناسم معلومات د طالبانو له واک څخه د پام وړ زیات شوي، د اګست او سپتمبر ٢٠٢١ او جنوري ٢٠٢٢ کې له لا زیاتوالي سره. اول شکل: د ٢٠٢١ کال د جنوري له ٣١ څخه تر ٢٠٢٢ کال د جنوري تر ٢٠٢٢ پورې، د ١٠٢ اغیزمنو افغان میرمنو د یوې ډلې په وړاندې د ټولو حسابونو لخوا د آنلاین جنسي ځورونې احصایوي بدلونونو ګراف. دوهم شکل: د ٢٠٢١ کال د جنوري له ٣١ څخه تر ٢٠٢٢ کال د جنوري تر ٢٠٢٢ پورې، د ١٠٢ نفوذ لرونکو افغان میرمنو د یوې ډلې په وړاندې د نارینه په توګه ثبت شوي حسابونو لخوا د آنلاین جنسیت ځورونې احصایوي بدلونونو ګراف. دريم شکل: د ٢٠٢١ کال د جنوري له ٣١ څخه تر ٢٠٢٢ کال د جنوري تر ٢٠٢٢ پورې، د ١٠٢ نفوذ لرونکو افغان میرمنو د یوې ډلې په وړاندې د نارینه په توګه ثبت شوي حسابونو لخوا د آنلاین جنسي ځورونې د لاسرسي احصایوي بدلونونو ګراف. د ٢٠٢١ په اګست کې د ځورونې یا غلط معلوماتو لرونکي ټویټونو ناڅاپي جوړښتي زیاتوالی د افغانستان د طالبانو له نیولو سره سمون لري. په هدفي ځورونو او ناسمو معلوماتو کې لومړی د پام وړ زیاتوالی د ٢٠٢١ کال د اګست په ١٨ د طالبانو لخوا د کابل له نیولو درې ورځې وروسته رامنځته شو. لومړنۍ تحلیل یوازې د لست شوي ١٠٢ ښځینه پروفایلونو مستقیم ذکر کولو باندې تمرکز کوي، او هغه ټویټونه شامل نه دي چې د نوم یا نورو شرایطو په واسطه ښځو ته راجع کیږي. د پایلې په توګه، د آنلاین ځورونې مطلق شمیر چې ښځې په نښه کوي په ناڅاپي توګه لوړ دي. ګراف ډیری مختلفي هغه جيگي ورځې ښیي چې د پروفایل ذکر کولو پورې اړوند د کلیدي کلمو اندازه شوي فریکونسۍ په ناڅاپه توګه زیاتوالی موندلی، د دې یوه بېلګه د سپټمبر د میاشتې په ومه نېټه ده چې په زرګونو خلک په کابل کې سړکونو ته راووتل چې د طالبانو او پاکستان پر ضد مظاهرې وکړي. فرخنده نادري مهرباني وکړئ!! افغانستان به هيڅکله هم ستاسو فاحشي مرستي ته اړتيا ونه لري، په افغانستان کې ستاسو فاسدانو ته ځای نشته/انځور د کرکې د وینا یو سکرین شاټ دي چې د افغانستان پخوانۍ استازې فرخنده زهرا نادري ته شوي وي، ټویټ حذف شوي وه مګر د أفغان وتنس تحقیق کونکو لخوا بیرته ترلاسه شو. د کرکې وړ وینا ترټولو لویه برخه د اغیزمنو افغان فعالانو میرمنوته شوي وي، چي په لیست کې د جنسي تیريو او ناسم معلوماتو پورې اړه لري، ډیری وختونه د فحشاء کلمه هم شامله ده، د دې ډول یوه بیلګه هغه ټویټ دی چې د یوې افغان خبریالې رابعه سادات ته لیکل شوی وه، چې ویلي یې ما څو ځلې له دې فاحشه سره جنسي اړیکه درلوده او اوس غواړم د هغې سكسي فلم خپور کړم، نور په مکرر ډول پیژندل شوي توهینونکي اصطلاحات دي لکه فاحشه پاکستاني یا نړیوال فاحشه. تحلیل ښیې چې د آنلاین ځورونې ډیری برخه چې د لیست شوي ښځینه نفوذ کونکو په نښه کوي، د نارینه او ښځینه د دواړو لخوا، د نارینه په توګه ثبت شوي د هغو اكونټونو لخوا پوسټ شوي چي په افغانستان کې میشت دي، په هرصورت اكونټونه په متحده ایالاتو، پاکستان او انګلستان کې هم پیژندل شوي. چلورم شکل د ډیمو ګرافیک لاسرسي او د ټویټونو جنسيت تحلیل ته کتنه چې اغیزمنې افغان میرمنې په نښه کو د افغان وتنس پلټونکي به د جنسیت په اړه د يو لویي پروژو د یوې برخې په توګه د افغان میرمنو پروړاندې د آنلاین ناوړه ګټه اخیستنې او ناسم معلوماتو څارنې او تحلیل ته دوام ورکړي.

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Resources Afghanistan’s shrinking information environment What is the information environment, and what challenges face Afghanistan’s own information space? How can we strengthen it? Read More OSINT 101: what is open source intelligence (OSINT)? This is the first article of an explainer series about OSINT, its techniques, and how these can be applied in real-world investigations, especially in Afghanistan. Read More Open source techniques and how to use them What are the initial steps in an open source investigation? Which open source techniques are used by our analysts? Read More Using open source to counter mis- and disinformation What is mis- and disinformation? How is it undermining Afghanistan’s information environment, and how can we help tackle it? Read More

Reports and Analysis Original reporting by the Afghan Witness team 28 Mar 2024 Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan prompt retaliatory actions from Taliban Pakistan stated the strikes were directed at militant group members located in Afghanistan, while the Afghan Taliban claimed that civilian residential areas were hit. Afghan Witness confirmed the deaths of several children following the strikes and verified retaliatory shelling and gunfire from Afghan forces towards Pakistani territory. Read more 28 Mar 2024 Accounts impersonating female journalists share pro-Taliban content Many of the impersonator accounts identified by Afghan Witness repeatedly use derogatory language toward the Afghan LGBTQIA+ community and attempt to defame activists and news anchors in exile. Read more 28 Mar 2024 ISKP claim responsibility for attack outside Kandahar bank According to the group’s statement, a suicide bomber targeted Taliban members withdrawing their salaries. Reports cite conflicting casualty figures, though a source at a hospital claimed 21 individuals were killed in the attack. Read more 1 Mar 2024 The anti-Taliban Khutba of Mawlawi Abdul Shakoor Hanif Shakoor's anti-Taliban speech departs from typical pro-Taliban Khutbas, and underscores the impact that dissenting religious voices can have against the Taliban regime Read more 28 Feb 2024 Taliban measure to enrol women in public medical institutes promoted by bot-like social media accounts The news that female graduates would be allowed to apply to study in public medical institutes in 11 provinces has been heavily promoted by social media accounts, some of which display bot-like behaviour Read more 28 Feb 2024 Pro-Taliban accounts promote Afshar Genocide hashtag Pro-Taliban accounts began sharing posts commemorating the anniversary of the 1993 Hazara massacre on X on February 10 to denounce Massoud’s military operation, whilst anti-Taliban activists called out pro-Taliban attempts to exacerbate ethnic tensions Read more 27 Feb 2024 'Playing on both sides': Russian manoeuvring in Afghanistan on the rise Over the past few months, Russia’s manoeuvring on Afghanistan appears to have increased, with indications of rising engagement with both Taliban and anti-Taliban forces. Read more 26 Feb 2024 Surge in female suicides linked to forced marriages, Taliban violence, and arrests Documenting 195 cases of suicide since April 2022, AW has observed a rise in female suicides since the Taliban seized power in 2021, and identified a pattern suggesting that ethnic minorities appear to make up a disproportionate share of the reported cases Read more 19 Feb 2024 Passport offices reopening leads to significant overcrowding and subsequent reclosure With some having waited over a year for a new passport, the reopening of passport offices in Kabul led to several days of chaos. Their reclosure means Afghans seeking to exit the country must revert to the unreliable online application process. Read more 12 Feb 2024 Nan FM radio closure highlights media freedom tensions Targeted intimidation technique or unpaid rent dispute? Conflicting claims regarding the forced closure of Nan FM Radio, Khost, illustrate the Taliban’s tensions with media entities Read more Load more

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ISKP claim responsibility for attack outside Kandahar bank According to the group’s statement, a suicide bomber targeted Taliban members withdrawing their salaries. Reports cite conflicting casualty figures, though a source at a hospital claimed 21 individuals were killed in the attack. 28 Mar 2024 Photo: © Afghan Witness On 21 March 2024, variou s source s reported a blast in Kandahar city. Multipl e accounts on X (formerly Twitter) circulated a photo depicting the blast's aftermath. The image shows a damaged building, the New Kabul Bank, with shattered windows and blood stains visible on the ground. Figure 1: Aftermath of the explosion in front of the New Kabul Bank office in Kandahar Additionally, an X account shared several images of injured individuals in a hospital, claiming they were victims of the incident, though no verification could be obtained. According to the Press Office of Kandahar Police Headquarters, cited by Shamshad News, a suicide attack occurred at 08:30 local time, in front of the New Kabul Bank office in Police District (PD) 1 of Kandahar City. In a statement , the Taliban Ministry of Interior attributed the blast to the detonation of a Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED). The statement added that initial investigations indicated the involvement of “Khawarij,” a term used by the Taliban to refer to Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). CCTV [WARNING: GRAPHIC] footage was later shared on X (formerly Twitter), showing the moment the suicide attacker detonated his explosives in a hallway of a shopping centre, adjacent to a large crowd of people on the street. Conflicting reports of casualties According to Kandahar police , the attack resulted in three fatalities and 12 injured as customers were waiting in front of the bank. Some reporters and media cited unnamed local and hospital sources, who alleged that the casualties significantly exceeded the figures provided by the Taliban. The Taliban’s director of Information and Culture for Kandahar, Inamullah Samangani, told Shamshad News that the reports of higher casualties were untrue, and that just a small number of people were wounded in the blast. Sources from Mirwais Hospital in Kandahar told Radio Free Europe that four people were killed and 25 were injured in the explosion. On the evening of 21 March 2024, the BBC released a report citing information from a hospital source, who confirmed that 21 individuals had lost their lives, and another 50 had sustained injuries in the explosion. However, AW was unable to verify these claims as no visual evidence was provided in these reports. Attack target Various medi a sources revealed that the explosion targeted Taliban members who were collecting their salaries. The New Kabul Bank, a state-run institution, has been responsible for disbursing salaries to government employees since the time of the Republican government. In several instances, its branches across various provinces have been attacked by the Taliban and ISKP . Some pro-Taliban accounts asserted that Khalil Ahmad, an employee of the Kandahar municipality, who was present to collect his salary, was among the casualties of the explosion. Multiple sources circulated reports concerning the alleged casualties of the Kandahar blast, including Taliban members and civilians. Taliban-affiliated accounts blame Pakistan for attack Several accounts on X attributed blame to Pakistan for orchestrating the Kandahar blast, citing a perceived motive of seeking retaliation for Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks within the country’s borders. Taliban-affiliated Al Mirsad Media published an article alleging that Pakistan was employing ISKP as a tool against Afghanistan. Jan Achakzai, the Information Minister for Balochistan, Pakistan, addressed this issue on X, asserting that Pakistan could directly retaliate, rather than employing ISKP for the attack. IS claim responsibility for the attack The Islamic State Central and Amaq news channel, in separate statements, claimed responsibility for the attack. They stated that a man named Muawiya Panjshiri detonated his explosive vest amidst a gathering of Taliban members who were queueing in front of the bank to receive their salaries. Additionally, the group released a masked photo , purportedly depicting the attacker. This marks the second attack claimed by ISKP in Kandahar, since the group’s emergence in Afghanistan. The previous attack struck a Shia mosque in Kandahar city, claiming the lives of numerous Shia civilians in October 2021. Identity of the attacker In statements, as well as a follow-up propaganda booklet released by ISKP-affiliated Al Azaim media, the attacker’s Panjshiri identity was emphasised. The 31-page booklet dedicated to the Kandahar attack highlighted the Taliban's alleged discrimination and killings based on ethnicity in Panjshir province; it claimed that the 21 March 2024 attack committed by Muawiya Panjshiri was evidence that ISKP, unlike the Taliban's nationalist movement, transcends ethnic boundaries. In the booklet, ISKP also warned that the killing of ordinary Panjshiri Muslims, based on ethnic prejudice, by Kandahari assailants would not go unquestioned. This is not the first occasion where ISKP has sought to provoke those in northern Afghanistan – often Tajiks, and notably residents in Panjshir – to mount opposition against the Taliban. In July 2023, Al Azaim media circulated a book advocating for residents of northern Afghanistan to unite with the group in opposition against the Taliban. Al Mirsad media refuted the Islamic State group's assertion regarding the identity of the Kandahar bomber. The outlet identified the attacker as Madiyarov Asadbek, and claimed that he hailed from a Central Asian nation. The outlet also claimed that Asadbek had recently become affiliated with ISKP, and stated that he had undergone a two-month training programme in Pakistan’s Balochistan province before arriving in Kandahar just ahead of the attack. On 24 March 2024, Afghanistan International published additional information regarding Asadbek, revealing that he was born in Uzbekistan in 1999, and that had previously pursued studies in Russia. Citing Pakistani sources, the outlet contradicted the Taliban's assertion that the attacker had arrived in Afghanistan shortly before the attack, stating that Asadbek had resided in Afghanistan since 2022. AW was unable to independently verify this claim. Pre-attack warnings On 29 February 2024, the Taliban reportedly apprehended a suspected ISKP affiliate from Kerala, India, in Kandahar. Although the Taliban refrained from issuing an official statement regarding the arrest, media reports surfaced indicating that Sana ul Islam had entered Afghanistan through Tajikistan with the intention of joining the ISKP faction. A photograph of his passport page circulated on social media platforms as proof of his identity. Following this, on 19 March 2024, the Kandahar Government's Media and Information Centre reported on a meeting between the Governor and local security officials. The session aimed to enhance security measures for Ramadan, and was attended by police chiefs, district governors, and other security personnel. During the meeting, the Governor stressed the importance of maintaining regular checkpoints, patrols, and sentries during the meeting, potentially indicating a heightened threat of attack. Share

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Accounts impersonating female journalists share pro-Taliban content Many of the impersonator accounts identified by Afghan Witness repeatedly use derogatory language toward the Afghan LGBTQIA+ community and attempt to defame activists and news anchors in exile. 28 Mar 2024 On 10 March 2024, journalist Sonia Niazi shared a video on X stating that a verified profile using her name was a fake account. She underscored that the content shared by this account, which had 39.9K followers, did not reflect her opinions as a journalist. The video was widely shared by activists , journalists , and media accounts on X and was also reported by Afghanistan International. As a TV anchor , Niazi has consistently appeared on air wearing a mask , following the May 2022 Taliban mandate that requires women on TV to cover their faces. However, she has expressed opposition towards the policy as reported by AFP and BBC news . Her profile picture on her X account, where she posted the video on 10 March 2024, shows Niazi unmasked with a traditional head covering. Her cover photo similarly shows Niazi, alongside her female colleagues, with their heads covered but faces exposed. Niazi joined X in September 2021. The page that shares pro-Taliban content, impersonating Niazi, joined the platform in June 2022. The profile picture in this latter account appears to be a screenshot from one of Niazi’s TOLOnews presentations. The impersonator account has also posted a voice note of Niazi. According to Niazi , this was recorded by the impersonator account while she was speaking in an X Space hosted by BBC Pashto. Beyond this impersonator account, Afghan Witness (AW) investigators identified several additional accounts and usernames on X and Facebook , using Niazi’s name and pictures, all of which were found to be fake; many of these accounts boasted significant numbers of followers – higher than her own follower count. Other fake accounts debunked This was not the first time that a relatively well-known public figure has claimed that fake accounts are operating under their name. According to a report by Afghanistan International , Freshta Jalalzai, an Afghan-American journalist, claimed that there is a fake account being used under her name. The account appears to have been suspended after she posted about it on 17 March 2024. The Afghanistan International report also mentioned Hasiba Atakpal, a former TOLOnews journalist. Atakpal posted a video on X on 26 October 2021 regarding fake accounts under her name. According to the report, one of the fake accounts using Atakpal’s name eventually changed its handle to @Hedayatullah111, and is currently owned by Hedayatullah Hedayat , the Deputy Director General of National Radio and Television Afghanistan, which is under Taliban control. AW analysts were unable to verify this claim. However, they observed that Hedayat’s account was created in 2020 , yet its oldest post dates to 19 October 2022. Two further impersonator accounts using Atakpal’s name, with over 978 and 619 followers, were identified as part of AW’s investigation. These accounts, however, have been inactive since 2019, and both were created in 2018. AW has tracked several other accounts impersonating activists and journalists on social media. Common patterns among these accounts are that they mostly pretend to be female – all female-presenting accounts have profile pictures in which the woman is wearing a niqab*– and that they share pro-Taliban content and imagery. These accounts typically have the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) flag as their cover image, and many currently feature the Palestinian flag . AW analysts also note that many of these impersonator accounts repeatedly use derogatory language toward the Afghan LGBTQIA+ community, target female journalists , and frequently attempt to defame activists and news anchors in exile, accusing them of promiscuity . Yasamin Safi is another Shamshad TV anchor who appears to have fallen victim to pro-Taliban impersonator accounts on social media. On Facebook, Safi announced that an account, using the handle @Yasamin_safi, was impersonating her on X. This impersonator account , which has more than 2K followers, appeared to use a screenshot from one of Safi’s news broadcasts, published on Shamshad TV’s YouTube channel , as its profile picture. Moreover, this account appears to share pro-Taliban content, highlighting the activities of Taliban officials. Alongside impersonator accounts, AW also uncovered several accounts that claimed to be Afghan women, using profile pictures of women taken from elsewhere on the internet, which share and promote pro-Taliban content. One of these accounts is Asma Wardak . While the account joined X in December 2023, AW determined that the image used as a profile picture was posted by a Pakistani user on 20 February 2023. The profile also includes a pinned picture of Taliban Defence Minister Mullah Yaqub, as well as a picture of a woman in a niqab holding a camera, with an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan flag photoshopped in the background. AW investigators found that the image of the woman was available on Pinterest and several other websites. Similarly, AW analysts determined that the X account Sana Selgai features a profile picture of a woman used by multiple profiles on the internet. The account follows the same pattern of sharing pro-Taliban content and features images related to the Taliban’s Defence Ministry. Conclusion AW analysts have investigated a number of fake and impersonator accounts that post pro-Taliban content. The pervasive presence of fake social media accounts exploiting the names of prominent Afghan journalists and activists, very often women, highlights a concerning trend in Taliban propaganda tactics. Not only is public space for women increasingly limited in Afghanistan, but the online space that women occupy is also under threat. Moreover, the tactics employed by pro-Taliban individuals often aim to legitimise the Taliban’s activities. Speaking about the issue to Rukshana Media , Laila Basim, the head of the Spontaneous Protest Movement, said that by using female-named handles on social media, pro-Taliban messages are transmitted more quickly. This is because these messages, when spread by accounts claiming to be women, are seen as women in Afghanistan approving of Taliban policies. This contrasts with and undermines women’s protest movements in Afghanistan, and aims to paint them as representing Western, rather than local, interests. The case of Sonia Niazi sheds light on the sophistication of these online campaigns. AW analysts note that the impersonator account made significant efforts to make the page look real by using imagery that appears to be personal, including a post featuring a newborn baby, and posts featuring Niazi’s voice, recorded from her professional broadcasts. In addition to spreading pro-Taliban propaganda, these impersonator accounts undermine female journalists operating in Afghanistan and sow confusion amongst their audiences. *Head to toe coverage where only the eyes are visible. Share