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Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan prompt retaliatory actions from Taliban Pakistan stated the strikes were directed at militant group members located in Afghanistan, while the Afghan Taliban claimed that civilian residential areas were hit. Afghan Witness confirmed the deaths of several children following the strikes and verified retaliatory shelling and gunfire from Afghan forces towards Pakistani territory. 28 Mar 2024 On 18 March 2024, Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesperson of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, issued a statement on X (formerly Twitter), claiming that “Pakistani planes bombed the houses of civilians” in four locations within the Afghan Dubai area of Khost's Spira district, and the Lamanah area of Paktika's Bermal district. The reported airstrikes came after an accusation by Pakistan’s Special Representative on Afghanistan, Asif Durrani, that “5,000 to 6,000 TTP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) militants have taken shelter in Afghanistan.” On 17 March, various Afghan and Pakistani news agencies reported that Durrani claimed Pakistan had evidence that the TTP was “receiving money from India through Afghan proxies.” The accusations were immediately refuted by Mujahid, who stated that although the administration was doing their “utmost” to ensure there was no presence of foreign groups in Afghanistan, the two countries still share a long border with areas that might be out of the Taliban’s control. Mujahid claimed the airstrikes on 18 March resulted in the deaths of eight civilians, including five women and three children. The attack was also reported by the Taliban Ministry of Defense, which stated that the houses were bombed by the Pakistani reconnaissance and fighter jets. According to eyewitnesses, a house belonging to a member of the Mehsud tribe, from South Waziristan, was targeted in Paktika, resulting in the deaths of his five children and two wives. Images of two [WARNING: GRAPHIC] deceased children circulated on social media following the attack, eliciting condemnation from Afghan Taliban supporters . The sources confirmed that the two children seen in the photos were among the five killed in a strike on the house in the Bermal district, Paktika province. Sources identified the village as “Lamanah,” however were unable to identify the exact building affected by the strike. Figure 1: Photograph showing the damaged house as a result of alleged airstrikes in the Lamanah area [32.728056, 69.324425] The Pakistani Foreign Ministry acknowledged the airstrikes, stating they were directed at the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group (HGB) and the TTP within Afghanistan. HGB is known to have an operational network in Pakistan’s North Waziristan tribal district, adjacent to where the airstrikes struck Afghanistan. Notably, HGB claimed responsibility for a significant attack on an army camp in Mir Ali Tehsil of North Waziristan on 16 March 2024, which involved six attackers, including a Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED). Conflicting reports on TTP Commander's fate Reports from Pakistani media suggested that Abdullah Shah Mehsud, a commander of the TTP, was among those killed in the airstrikes , alongside unidentified members of the HGB group. In response, the TTP's Umar Media released a video featuring Mehsud denying his death. In the video, Meshud asserts he is fighting against security forces in his native South Waziristan; however, the precise location where his message was recorded was not disclosed. In an interview with RTA Radio, Mujahid contested the claim that Mehsud was in Afghanistan, emphasising that the commander was not within Afghan territory. Figure 2: A screenshot from the Umar Media video depicts Commander Abdullah Shah dismissing reports of his demise. While certain media outlets alleged that the Pakistani Air Force targeted areas in Kunar province, local sources disputed these claims, stating that although fighter jets were observed circling the area, no bombardment occurred. This incident is reminiscent of similar events in April 2022 , when the Pakistani Air Force targeted alleged TTP hideouts in Kunar, Khost, and Paktika provinces. One such attack reportedly resulted in the deaths of children in a refugee’s home, dispelling initial claims of targeting a senior TTP commander. Taliban promise retaliatory actions Following the airstrikes, pro-Afghan Taliban media accounts and prominent members expressed outrage on social media and issued threats of retaliation. Notably, a religious order for a counter-attack, which was circulated widely among Taliban supporters , was first shared by pro-Taliban Al-Mirsad Media. On 18 March 2024, Mujahid confirmed retaliatory actions, specifying nine locations where Taliban forces targeted Pakistani positions in the areas adjacent to Khost, Paktika, and Paktia provinces. Taliban supporters shared footage allegedly depicting attacks targeting Pakistani territory. AW investigators geolocated videos showing shelling and gunfire towards Pakistani territory, from Afghanistan’s Paktia province. The image below shows the geolocation of a video , shared by a pro-Taliban account with almost 30K followers, showing artillery being fired towards a Pakistani outpost on 18 March 2024. Figure 3: Geolocation of fire from Afghanistan (bottom left) and hitting a Pakistani border building (top right) [33.839371, 69.955092]. How the clashes developed Between 18 and 20 March, social media users and media outlets shared images and videos allegedly showing Taliban reinforcements on the move towards the border with Pakistan. These reports claimed the military was being deployed to “respond to the aggression by Pakistani army.” AW investigators were unable to immediately geolocate the videos showing these alleged military movements. In addition to gunfire towards Pakistani border posts, online users also claimed the Taliban targeted Pakistani villages near the border, hitting buildings in the Burki village in the upper Kurram district of Pakistan. Despite the image showing shelling damage to buildings, the absence of landmarks visible in the image prevented AW investigators from verifying the location. On 18 March, pro-Taliban social media users and news agencies shared videos of vehicles with mounted artillery, reporting that the units led by one of the Taliban commanders, Abdul Hamid Khorasani, were headed to Paktia’s border with Pakistan. Khorasani corroborated this in a video statement released by local media outlets on the evening of the same day. In the video, recorded at night time, Khorasani claimed the border situation was de-escalated and there was no longer a conflict after their “crushing response” to the Pakistani military. In the footage, Khorasani could be seen with his unit of approximately 19 men armed with rocket launchers and rifles. Around the same time, independent Afghan media agency Nedaey Baloch, shared a video showing a fire, allegedly in the border area, at night, and reported that a number of Pakistani soldiers had fled from their security posts. AW also recorded one [WARNING: GRAPHIC] picture of the body of an alleged Taliban member who was reportedly killed in clashes in the Dand Patan district of Paktia. On the evening of 18 March, pro-Taliban social media users claimed that Taliban forces allegedly crossed the border and captured some Pakistani military posts, sharing videos in which Taliban members can be seen near the gate of a Pakistani military station, placing the Taliban flag allegedly inside Pakistani territory. AW investigators geolocated the footage and confirmed the Taliban were on the border, however, still officially on Afghan-controlled territory, as seen below. Figure 4: Geolocation of a group of Taliban military members raising the Taliban flag near the border with Pakistan [33.828569, 69.952689]. Mujahid clarified that these attacks were not intended to instigate a war with Pakistan, rather, he claimed, they were intended to respond to Pakistani aggression. He also attributed the hostility towards Afghanistan to a few army generals in Pakistan. Pakistani media corroborated the attacks citing government sources who reported casualties – including two soldiers, and an army officer – in an assault on Pakistani forces in the Kurram district, which is adjacent to Paktika, where shelling was reported. ISKP reacts to the conflict On 19 March 2024, ISKP-affiliated Al Azaim Media issued a statement titled “A Warning to the Apostates of the Infidel Regime of Pakistan.” In the statement, ISKP denounced the Taliban as subservient to Pakistan, dismissing their response to Pakistani airstrikes as mere theatrics. The ISKP vowed retribution for civilian casualties resulting from Pakistan’s airstrikes, asserting that IS fighters would hold those responsible to account. The statement concluded with a promise of forceful and relentless vengeance: “Prepare yourselves for a fierce and bloody revenge, as the Mujahideen of the Islamic State will soon hold you accountable for these crimes!” Clashes de-escalate after two days On 20 March, TOLO News shared a video in which Mali Khan Sediq, the Deputy Chief of Army Staff of Islamic Emirate forces, can be heard saying: “We are capable of giving a reciprocal response to Pakistan.” Sediq added: “It is correct that we will not be able to hit Islamabad from here, but those within one hundred metres will not survive.” According to the outlet, the speech took place at a gathering in Logar’s Kharwar district. On the same day, a pro-Taliban propagandist, Hafiz Umari, shared pictures on X from Sediq’s visit to Paktika’s Dand Patan district, where he met with soldiers at their posts. Allegedly, the purpose of the visit was to “assess the situation.” According to Umari’s post, the intensity of the clashes at the border has decreased, and the Deputy Chief warned Pakistan that although the Taliban are not in favour of the war, the Taliban forces will respond when needed. Share

​ ​ 28 Mar 2024

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The anti-Taliban Khutba of Mawlawi Abdul Shakoor Hanif Shakoor's anti-Taliban speech departs from typical pro-Taliban Khutbas, and underscores the impact that dissenting religious voices can have against the Taliban regime 1 Mar 2024 Photo: © Afghan Witness, September 2023 Videos circulate of Shakoor's Khutba On 2 February, multiple sources circulated a video clip on X (formerly Twitter) featuring Kunduz religious cleric Mawlawi Abdul Shakoor Hanif criticising the Taliban regime. Taken together, these video clips were viewed at least 24.6K times, as of the time of writing. During a Friday prayer Khutba [1] (sermon) at the Arzbigi mosque in Kunduz City, Shakoor said that the Taliban regime was oppressive, and claimed that the group did not adhere strictly to Sharia principles. Shakoor also questioned the independence of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and claimed that the Taliban was acting as a Pakistani puppet. To this point, he said: “How can you tell yourself that you are free when your authority is in the hands of Pakistan's ISI [2] ?” Shakoor then took aim at Taliban foot soldiers, asking them whether they fought for two decades to oppress their people or whether they aimed to establish an actual Islamic System. He then cited the Prophet's teachings, urging disobedience to orders issued by the Emir that conflict with Sharia, and warned against blind obedience. “God knows if you truly understand your Emir. Your leader could be ISI from Pakistan, and you may follow orders without grasping whom you are obeying,” he said. Shakoor also criticised the Taliban's taxation policies, asserting that Islam and Hanafi jurisprudence do not support the concept of taxation. He said that under the previous government, there was a tax, but noted that it was less burdensome; now, he said, people were suffering from poverty, but the Taliban continues to impose higher taxes on them. The Khutba also highlighted the way that those who speak out against Taliban oppression face severe consequences and are often labelled as being part of the (anti-Taliban) “Resistance” or “Daesh.” He claimed that those who are labelled as such are then often subject to raids, arrests, imprisonment, and brutal physical abuse, including genital torture. Under these conditions, he said, individuals may be coerced into confessing to crimes that they did not commit. Shakoor’s next target was the name “Afghanistan” itself. He said that it was a “colonial-imposed name,” which he considers to be a historical injustice. He said that the name was a deliberate act to conceal the region's identity as Khorasan, where Imam Mahdi [3] is expected to appear. He further asserted that the name “Afghanistan” came from colonisers naming the land after a small group of people from the Suleiman Mountains [4] , called Afghan, Pashtun, or Pathan, who were known for their ruthlessness. Shakoor then asserted his unwavering commitment to speaking out against oppression, even if it meant facing the threat of death. He claimed that, despite recurrent warnings and periods of staying home due to potential danger, he remains resolute in raising his voice for truth. Alleged Taliban response According to Aamaj News , the Khutba video is from January 2024. There were subsequent reports that the Taliban apprehended Shakoor sometime after his speech in the mosque. AW sources confirmed that the Taliban had arrested Shakoor and added that he was then transferred to Kabul for additional questioning. They also noted that Shakoor, a Salafi scholar and Tajik, hailing from the Shahri Buzurg district in Badakhshan province, had resided in Kunduz for the past two decades; during this time, he taught at various madrasas, including Ashraf-ul-Madaris, and led prayers across several districts including, recently, in the Arzbigi area of Kunduz city. AW confirmed, from the Ashraf-ul-Madaris Madrasa's Facebook account , that Shakoor, also known as Mufti Abdul Shakoor Hanif, was a teacher at this madrasa until at least October 2021, when the account was last active. His name appeared on the list of teachers and an article he authored was published on the page. It is notable that some posts on the page, dating from 2021, include narratives regarding religious issues related to Ibn Taymiyya, a Salafi scholar well-respected by the Islamic State group. Figure: Ashraf-ul-Madaris Madrassa's 2021 timetable, indicating teachers and their respective subjects. Shakoor’s name is highlighted in red. Shakoor's criticism of the alleged imposition of the name 'Afghanistan' on Khorasan territory, coupled with the claim that Pashtuns are a collective originating from the Suleiman Mountains, constitutes a negative narrative about Pashtuns. Anti-Taliban and pro-resistance [WARNING: GRAPHIC] factions , in their propaganda, embrace this narrative to undermine the Taliban by emphasising their Pashtun identity and characterising them as regressive . Moreover, Shakoor's assertion that the taxation policy implemented by the Taliban lacks a basis in Islam mirrors the ISKP stance on the same issue. On 25 January 2024, the ISKP-affiliated Al Azaim media published a 59-page booklet condemning the Taliban's collection of customs and taxes, noting that according to religious texts, these practices are un-Islamic. Further critiques On 2 February, following Shakoor's anti-Taliban remarks, Shia scholar Waiz Zada Behsudi criticised the Taliban for marginalising Shias. Addressing a Shia gathering in western Kabul, on the recent Taliban arrests of women, he highlighted historical grievances, including the 1995 murder of Shia leader Abdul Ali Mazari by the Taliban. Beshudi then underscored the Taliban's challenges with Afghanistan's Shia community, listing the exclusion of Jafari Jurisprudence and the recent Hijab-related arrests as key concerns. Then, on 3 February, Mawlawi Syed Hamid Hussaini , a religious figure from Ghor province, in an interview with Culture TV, discussing the situation in his province, criticised the Taliban’s nepotism and lack of meritocracy in local governance. Religious scholars have previously criticised the Taliban on various occasions. For example, in December 2021, Mawlawi Abdul Qudos Almari , from Faryab province, characterised the Taliban as “criminals” and challenged the Taliban’s leader to a debate on Sharia principles. Then, in May 2023, Mawlawi Nooruddin , from Baghlan province, reportedly refused to mention the name of the Taliban’s Supreme Leader in a Khutba; it was later reported that unknown gunmen killed Noorddin in Nahrin district. Despite past incidents, this new wave of criticism is unique as it appears to originate from loud and from prominent mosques. Previously released videos of anti-Taliban remarks by religious scholars resurface Following the video of Shakoor going viral on social media, certain accounts strategically surfaced archival videos featuring clerics criticising the Taliban, amplifying them as integral to the Ulema's anti-Taliban remarks campaign. For instance, on 6 February 2024, a news account on X, boasting a following of over 15K, shared a video that had initially been published on 16 January 2022 . In the footage, Mawlawi Abdul Qadir, a former prayer leader at the central mosque in Taluqan City, Takar province, who was ousted from this role prior to making these comments, claimed that some members of the Taliban were engaging in jihad not for the sake of Sharia but rather for personal gain, driven by motives of financial and political power. On 9 February 2024, another video surfaced on social media featuring Mawlawi Zakaria Fayiz, the prayer leader of a mosque in Taluqan City. In this video, which dates to May 2023 and was originally shared by YouTube channel Mazhare Haq, Fayiz openly criticised the bias and exclusivity which he claims are prevalent in the Taliban regime. It is noteworthy, however, that Fayiz’ speech was not solely focused on criticising the Taliban; rather, he appeared to be denouncing ethnic and linguistic discrimination, from the Taliban and anti-Taliban groups, alike. Reactions to Shakoor’s remarks Various pro-Taliban propagandists on X condemned Shakoor’s remarks and bias towards Pashtuns , and argued that if he has valid criticism against Taliban’s taxation, he can discuss it with the relevant Taliban officials. Other pro-Taliban accounts disseminated a narrative detailing Shakoor's history, alleging long-standing pro-Daesh and anti-Taliban sentiments. This narrative claims Shakoor encouraged his students in Ashraf-ul-Madaris Madrasa to join ISKP in 2018, leading to Taliban warnings against pro-ISKP activities at the madrasa. Similarly, another pro-Taliban account highlighted the alignment between Shakoor's arguments and those put forth by ISKP and the anti-Taliban resistance groups, claiming that he is advocating for the interests of both groups. On the other hand, several anti-Taliban accounts lauded Shakoor's comments on the Taliban’s oppressive actions, hailing him as a courageous religious scholar for speaking the truth, with many accounts promoting and resharing parts of his speech. Sima Noori, a prominent Hazara activist, highlighted Shakoor's observations regarding the Taliban's imposition of oppressive taxes on the public, as well as their arrests and torture of dissenting voices. Meanwhile, Alisher Shahir, an Afghan journalist, drew attention to Shakoor's commentary on labelling adversaries with the tags of ISKP and anti-Taliban resistance groups, Moreover, Adalat Hasan Ali, an Afghan analyst, noted that the comments made by Shakoor and Behsudi served as a challenge to the Taliban’s brutal actions, which he said have transformed Afghanistan into a “slaughterhouse” and a landscape marred by violence. Analysis Shakoor's anti-Taliban statements echo the tone of the Taliban's enemies, including ISKP and anti-Taliban Resistance Forces. His comments are significant as they represent a notable departure from earlier instances of religious scholars criticising the Taliban. His use of the Khutba, a platform where pro-Taliban messages are typically shared, adds significance to his dissent. The reactions to his critique underscore the impact and importance of dissenting voices from religious figures and mosques against the Taliban regime. The anti-Taliban critique from prominent Shia cleric Behsudi, although separate and community-specific, aligned with Shakoor's remarks. This led anti-Taliban accounts to leverage both instances in a unified communications effort. The critiques expressed by other Afghan clerics regarding the Taliban regime consistently revolved around the exclusivity of the regime; these concerns centred on the Pashtun-dominated structure of the Taliban regime among all critics. Additionally, the resurfacing of older videos criticising the Taliban within this campaign underscores the growing risk of misinformation and disinformation, emphasising the need for careful handling of information in such contexts. [1] In contrast to other congregational prayers, the Friday Prayer unfolds within the expansive confines of a central mosque, attracting a diverse assembly of community members. The Friday Prayer Khutba (sermon) holds paramount importance, functioning as a pivotal means to convey crucial messages to the community, exploring significant and contemporary topics through the lens of Sharia. [2] Inter-Services Intelligence, the Pakistan’s Intelligence Agency. [3] Imam Mahdi, a Muslim redeemer, is expected to appear before the end of the world to establish peace and justice worldwide. [4] One out of several historical narratives about the origin of Pashtuns is that the cradle of the race was within the Suleiman Mountains. Share

​ ​ 1 Mar 2024

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Pro-Taliban accounts promote Afshar Genocide hashtag Pro-Taliban accounts began sharing posts commemorating the anniversary of the 1993 Hazara massacre on X on February 10 to denounce Massoud’s military operation, whilst anti-Taliban activists called out pro-Taliban attempts to exacerbate ethnic tensions 28 Feb 2024 Photo: © Afghan Witness, October 2024 On 10 February, official Taliban and pro-Taliban accounts started sharing posts with the hashtag #AfsharGenocide on X (formerly Twitter). When using the hashtag, users commemorated the anniversary of the Hazara massacre in Afshar – part of Kabul city’s Police District 5 (PD5) – and denounced those responsible for it. The Afshar massacre refers to an event that occurred around 10-11 February 1993, when Burhanuddin Rabbani (the President of Afghanistan from 1992-1996) and Ahmad Shah Massoud (anti-Soviet resistance leader and the Defence Minister under President Rabbani) launched a military operation to overthrow militias in the area of Afshar in West Kabul – an area that was predominantly populated by Hazaras. The military operation escalated into the systematic targeting and massacre of Hazaras, including women and children. Human Rights Watch considers the event to be one of the “worst mass atrocities of Afghanistan’s civil war of the early 1990s.” Data on #AfsharGenocide Between 10-12 February 2024, users on X shared the hashtag #AfsharGenocide to remember the event that had occurred 30 years prior. According to Meltwater - a social media listening tool – the hashtag received over 5,000 total mentions in this period. As is seen from the graph below, a spike occurred on 10 February 2024, with the hashtag being mentioned more than 3,000 times. Figure: Graph generated from Meltwater, showing the use of the hashtag #AfsharGenocide from 1 February to 15 February 2024. Accounts spreading the hashtag and related narratives The hashtag was used by both official Taliban and pro-Taliban accounts on X to commemorate the massacre and denounce Massoud’s military operation. The first user to share a post with the hashtag was a pro-Taliban account with over 60k followers on X, @BaryaalOmar. The post, which received over 5,000 views, stated: “two and a half decades ago (1371, 21st and 22nd of Dalwe month) [1] during internal wars, thousands of Hazara citizens were killed by Shura Nazar5 and their partners in [the] Afshar area of Kabul city, the majority of them were women and children.” A similar caption was used in a post by another pro-Taliban account, @talhahmubareez1, with 20k followers, alongside an image depicting one of the alleged victims of the massacre. The hashtag was also shared in several posts by Qari Saeed Khosty, a senior Taliban official and former spokesperson for the Taliban’s Ministry of Interior. Most were “reposts” from other accounts, with Khosty copying and pasting each post’s caption. For example, the caption of one of the posts , which had originally been shared by pro-Taliban account @MominShahKakar3, denounced the massacre and called Massoud “a traitor of the nation and [one of] the murderers of the Afghan nation.” Khosty’s most viewed post using the hashtag, with over 46k views, was originally shared by Sonia Niazi, a TOLO news reporter and presenter. The post, which includes a video, called Massoud a “national traitor” and claimed he was responsible for the death of thousands of Hazaras. Khosty also reposted a documentary (screenshot below), which had been originally shared by @talhahmubareez1. Both accounts used the caption: “Short documentary about the Afshar Genocide in Kabul - massacre of oppressed Hazara people in Kabul.” On both accounts, the post received more than 15k views. The documentary was also reshared by a pro-Taliban account, @panjsher0021, with 37.8k followers, with the caption: “Afshar disaster A crime whose effects are still present and the perpetrators of this cruelty are currently demanding new power… In the video, the father of several martyrs says that the curse is on Rabbani and his entire cabinet.” Figure: Screenshot of a post shared by Qari Saeed Khosty which translated reads: “Short documentary about the Afshar Genocide in Kabul - massacre of oppressed Hazara people in Kabul.” Another pro-Taliban account, @A_Yun_500, with 12k followers, shared a post with images depicting those involved in the massacre, including a picture of Massoud. The post was shared with the caption: “The great tragedy of the Afshars, in addition to the genocide, also caused the dissension of the Hazara people. Since then, the Hazara people have been divided into groups. Generations have been killed here but our memory is still weak.” The same image was also shared by @talhahmubareez1 with the caption: “The killers of our countrymen in [the] Afshar incident. What are you doing?” Anti-Taliban reactions on social media Anti-Taliban activists took to X to denounce the posts being shared with the hashtag by Taliban and pro-Taliban accounts. According to anti-Taliban activists, pro-Taliban and official Taliban accounts could be sharing posts with the hashtags with the aim of sowing distrust and exacerbating ethnic tensions and disunity between non-Pashto ethnic groups, especially between Tajiks and Hazaras. By sharing the hashtag, Taliban accounts sought to exploit the fact that Massoud, an ethnic Tajik, was responsible for the Hazara massacre in Afshar. A prominent anti-Taliban activist, @Mahsa056, with 37k followers, shared a post highlighting how “[...] the propaganda machine of the Taliban is working hard to [...] inflame the Afshar issue in order to create discord between Hazara[s] and Tajik[s].” In a similar fashion, other anti-Taliban activists, such as @SameerBedrud (30k followers) and @arifrahmanii (129k followers), shared posts warning against the Taliban’s real intentions for mentioning the Afshar massacre. A post shared by @arifrahmanii (screenshot below), translated literally, reads: “We are in the day and night of the unforgettable tragedy of Afshar. We honour the memory of its victims and demand the trial of its perpetrators […] but we will not be fooled by Talib, rioters and sick hearts. The Taliban, which has hundreds of thousands of horrific crimes in its records, is a huge disaster in our time. Be careful of devils and idiots.” Figure: Screenshot of a post shared by an anti-Taliban activist on X (formerly Twitter). The post, translated literally, reads: “We are in the day and night of the unforgettable tragedy of Afshar. We honour the memory of its victims and demand the trial of its perpetrators without compromise and without delay, and we expect all those who seek justice and believe in human rights to join the citizens of Hazara as guardians and cooperate in suing for the victims of the Afshar disaster. But we will not be fooled by Talib, rioters and sick hearts. The Taliban, which has hundreds of thousands of horrific crimes in its records, is a huge disaster in our time. Be careful of devils and idiots.” To conclude, between 10 and 12 February 2024, the hashtag #AfsharGenocide was mentioned more than 5,000 times by Taliban accounts on X. Official Taliban and pro-Taliban accounts shared the hashtag to commemorate the anniversary of the Hazara massacre and denounce Massoud’s violent actions in Afshar, with some posts calling him a “national traitor.” By sharing the hashtag, Taliban accounts sought to call out and discredit all those who still support Massoud, namely the National Resistance Front (NRF). The NRF, founded and led by Ahmad Massoud, Ahmad Shah Massoud’s son, has been mobilising resistance efforts against the Taliban since their takeover in 2021. Several anti-Taliban activists on X, however, reacted to the hashtag and proceeded to call out the Taliban for trying to exacerbate ethnic tensions in society and sow distrust between Tajiks and Hazaras. [1] The Afghan date “1371, 21st and 22nd of Dalwe month” is 10 and 11 February 1993, in the Gregorian calendar. 5 A resistance force created by Massoud in the 1980s. Share

​ ​ 26 Feb 2024

Surge in female suicides linked to forced marriages, Taliban violence, and arrests Documenting 195 cases of suicide since April 2022, AW has observed a rise in female suicides since the Taliban seized power in 2021, and identified a pattern suggesting that ethnic minorities appear to make up a disproportionate share of the reported cases 26 Feb 2024 Photo: © Afghan Witness, 2022 WARNING: This report contains links to graphic imagery, reference to suicide, and descriptions of physical and sexual abuse There have been at least 195 cases of suicide in Afghanistan since April 2022, according to data compiled by AW [1] . Suicide cases in Afghanistan appear to rise each year, possibly linked to the escalating economic crisis , unemployment , domestic violence , forced marriage , mental health disorders , Taliban restrictions , and Taliban-related violence and human rights violations . AW observations in reported suicides: April 2022-today AW found that suicides were most often recorded among Afghan women, but that they were also common among men, as well as female and male minors, recording an age range of 10 to 72 . Although hanging was the post prevalent method of suicide recorded by AW, other methods recorded include gunshot injuries , poisonings , narcotics overdoses , self-immolation , and throwing oneself to one’s death. However, there were a number of cases in which the age, sex of the victim, and means of self-harm were not provided. While unemployment appears to significantly contribute to suicide among young Afghan men, causes of suicides among women are multifaceted. In reports, female suicides are frequently listed as stemming from domestic violence, an increase in early and forced marriages , Taliban-related violence such as rape , detention , and Taliban-imposed restrictions – including bans on education and the closure of universities and schools. AW analysts also observed a recent trend of women committing suicide following their release from Taliban prisons in Kabul and Balkh. It is highly likely that AW data does not capture a considerable share of suicide incidents, due to societal stigma and limited reporting of individual events, whereas media outlets on the ground have provided significantly higher figures. For example, Etilaatroz reported 213 suicides between 21 April 2022 and 21 April 2023 alone. AW analysts were unable to independently verify this figure, however it too likely also represents an undercount of the true scale of the problem. In this report, Etilaatroz listed Faryab, the predominantly Uzbek province, as the location with the highest rates of suicide in Afghanistan; this aligns with data collected by AW. The impact on Faryab province was further highlighted by the former provincial governor, who told Zawia News there had been 22 suicide cases in the province between 22 May 2023 and 21 June 2023. Suicides related to early and forced marriage Suicides are notoriously underreported, and those among minors in Afghanistan are particularly difficult to monitor. However, as forced marriages are on the rise in Afghanistan as a result of economic pressure (according to the United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction ) , it is likely that related suicides are similarly witnessing an uptick. Accordingly, AW has tracked claims of 11 suicides related to forced marriages of underage girls since April 2022. On 20 January 2024, Zan TV posted on X (formerly Twitter): “Local sources in Baghlan province say that a young girl in the Deh Salah district of the province committed suicide due to forced marriage.” The victim was 17 and had been married to a 37-year-old man four months prior. It was further reported that she had previously made several unsuccessful attempts on her life, following the marriage. Not two weeks later, on 2 February 2024, a local journalist in Faryab posted about the suicide of another 17-year-old girl on Facebook . According to Rokhshana Media , which also reported on the incident, this girl committed suicide after strongly opposing a marriage that her father approved. Suicides related to Taliban violence and arrests AW has also observed a recent trend in claims of female suicides relating to Taliban violence, following arrests and detention. In the wake of the Taliban's campaign arresting women and girls for noncompliance with the hijab in January 2024, AW recorded various [WARNING: GRAPHIC] claims of suicide , which were supported by on the ground reports gathered by credible organisations, relating to experiences of Taliban violence and imprisonment. On 28 January 2024 several social media accounts also shared [WARNING: GRAPHIC] pictures of women who had been released from Taliban prisons with signs of torture. Activist Bibi Gul, who used the pseudonym Zahra Mohammadi, underwent a similar experience before committing suicide on 22 December 2023. According to the Unity and Solidarity of Afghanistan Women’s Movement , the organisation with which she was affiliated, Bibi Gul initially arrested in September 2021 and had been contemplating suicide ever since. Also in connection to women’s detentions, on 28 January 2024, Exile TV posted a video of a woman on X, a mother of a one-year-old, who was allegedly arrested by the Taliban and sexually assaulted. She said that she had contemplated suicide as a result of the trauma that she suffered, but refrained for the sake of her child. She added, however, that if she were to follow through on her thoughts of self harm, that she would kill both herself and her child. Sexual assault and gender-based violence in the Taliban’s female detention centres has been well reported by Afghan media. On 7 February 2024, 8am media reported on women’s experience in Taliban detention centres in three northeastern provinces. This report detailed sexual violence including gangrape, and hitting women’s genitals with pipes and brooms. The same outlet reported on similar issues in female detention centres in Samangan, Faryab and Jowzjan provinces in May 2023, alleging that 16 out of 90 women who were imprisoned became pregnant as a result of repeated sexual assault. Societal stigma leads to underreporting of suicide and its motivations While motives for suicide vary, open source information often lists the rationale for reported suicides as " unknown ” . Based on AW data, domestic violence appears to be the most common driver of suicides among women in Afghanistan. However, many reports, including those in the media, also point to " family disputes ," " family problems , " and " mental health issues " . According to 8am media , families in Afghanistan often deny allegations of suicide, to avoid cultural stigmas, whilst others request further investigations and autopsies to determine their relative’s cause of death. Crucially, there have also been reports that the Taliban has prevented autopsies and further investigations from taking place in instances of probable suicide. Conclusion Overall there are investigative and forensic gaps concerning open-source suicide reports at large in Afghanistan. Cultural and social stigmas surrounding suicide lead to a culture of secrecy, which further benefits from a lack of Taliban cooperation in providing data on the incidence of suicide. Past alleged suicide cases also reveal possible Taliban interference, hindering autopsies and forensic evaluations. Family involvement in the aftermath of Taliban detentions and related violence, for the purpose of restoring honour to the family must also be taken into account. This contextual basis, coupled with insufficient evidence, makes it challenging to ascertain whether individual cases are femicides, murders, or actual suicides. Regardless, the primary victims of these ongoing cases are most often women, including female minors. The increasing levels of women's suicides or suicidal inclinations, particularly correlating with Taliban violence, imprisonment, and restrictions, suggest that women are suffering at the hands of the de facto authorities, and continue to suffer physical and psychological injuries following their release. [1] AW began monitoring suicides in Afghanistan in April 2022. Share

​ ​ 28 Feb 2024